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Introduction

“Nobody knew health care could be so complicated.” (Conway, 2017)
-

President Donald Trump

In early 2017, the current President of the United States stood before a group of health
insurers and made a bold statement about the incomprehensibility of health care reform. Perhaps
the president is correct. Perhaps there is no way to truly understand how complex the American
health care system is and how difficult it is to change. Alternatively, maybe this is common
knowledge. Maybe as a nation, Americans grasp that the health care system is more complicated
than any given person can conceive it to be. Possibly, and even more likely, the
incomprehensibility of the health care system has been revealed time and time again in this
nation’s history, in the failures and triumphs of each and every administration.
The real question we should be asking about the United States health care system may
not be in regard to its complexity, but rather how it has come to exist in its current state at all.
How have we arrived at a system that is so unwieldy as to confuse a sitting president and strike
fear into the eyes of a confused and concerned populous?
Oft-cited statistics reference the tremendously high costs of the United States health care
system and a noticeable lack of positive health outcomes in return. In 2016, the United States
spent 17.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an incredible $3.3 trillion, on health care
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016). Despite spending an average of more than
$10,000 per capita annually, the United States continues to experience worse health outcomes
than comparable high-income nations (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016;
Schneider et al., 2017).
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Compared to countries like Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, the United
States performs poorly on population health measures such as infant mortality, life expectancy
from birth, and chronic disease rates (Schneider et al., 2017). Measurements of health care
efficiency indicate that the United States lags behind other countries in accessibility,
administrative efficiency, and health disparities as well (Schneider et al., 2017). Comparisons
between spending and health outcomes clearly demonstrate the inefficiencies of the American
health care system, but these numbers fail to recognize the real impacts of this system on the
population. To evaluate the actual effects of the health care system on a population, one can look
at mortality amenable to health care. This measure estimates the number of deaths that occur
from lack of health care or lack of quality health care during a given period. In 2016, the United
States mortality rate amenable to health care was 112 per 100,000 people, or approximately
362,000 people annually (Schneider et al., 2017). Even that value, as startling as it may be, does
not capture the actual American health care experience. To achieve a more complete
understanding, past and current events reveal how this system was developed and how the effects
manifest in real health outcomes.
The aim of this paper is to utilize past successes and failures in health care reform to gain
a more comprehensive understanding of the current health care system in the United States and
how it has come to exist in its current state. In addition to investigating the historical precedent
of health care reform, this paper evaluates the role of traditional American norms and values in
directing policy development. These norms and values are inextricably linked to the formation of
health care opinions and policies. Finally, considering past reforms and the role of American
values, this paper will speculate on the future of health care reform in America.
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Norms, Values, and Attitudes

Norms, values, and attitudes are essential to the development and understanding of public
policy (Ruger, 2007). Any attempt to determine how health care in the United States has
developed requires an understanding of the values and attitudes that have come to define this
nation (Ruger, 2007). From its early stages, health care has had more in common with social
policies than fiscal reforms, and social policies are especially subject to the pervasive values and
attitudes of a nation (Ruger, 2007). Investigations into the role of partisanship, individualism,
cynicism, and incrementalism elucidate how these cultural and political norms, values, and
attitudes have contributed to the health care system in the United States as it currently exists
(Ruger, 2007).

Individualism
Social policies have a long and contentious history in the United States (Ruger, 2007).
Legislation like Medicaid and other social programs like Social Security, unemployment
insurance, and food stamps have all faced national ridicule because of well-established negative
beliefs about welfare and social programming (Ruger, 2007). Opposition to social support
legislation claims that welfare-style programs infringe on individual rights and freedoms (Ruger,
2007). Independence and individualism are hallmark values in the United States, and key values
in the development of health care policy (Vladeck, 2003).
While evaluations of health care attitudes indicate that Americans believe health policy to
be unique from other social policies, concerns about individual rights have contributed to more
than one reform failure (Schlesinger, 1993). The general view seems to be that health needs are
fundamental to the individual and outside of human control to a degree that other social statuses
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like income, employment status, and criminality are not (Ruger, 2007). General consensus about
the existence of a moral commitment to the uninsured exists; however, the acceptance of a need
for health and health care conflicts with individualistic beliefs in reasoned self-interest and a
pervasive unwillingness for self-sacrifice (Ruger, 2007). This dichotomy between individualism
and a commitment to the health of others contributes to a social and political system that
demands health care reform but is wholly unequipped to develop actual legislation.
A strong desire for health care reform has been well recorded in the United States since
World War II, but there have been few successful nationalizing reform efforts (Schlesinger,
1993). Many major attempts at reform have been effectively eliminated because they appeared to
promote anti-individualist sentiments like federalized or socialized health care (Blendon et al.,
1994). Others have failed to ever make it out of Congress because they required compulsory
enrollment, which some perceive as an infringement on the rights of the individual (Blendon et
al., 1994). More recently, continuing complaints about the individual mandate under the Obama
administration indicate that individualism is still a defining value in the health care debate, and
one that has a well-established influence on public opinion and congressional support (Ferguson,
Fowler, & Nichols, 2008).

Partisanship
Divided political discourse has long been an influential part of health care reform
(Ferguson et al., 2008). Harkening back to the 1940s and fears of socialized medicine,
partisanship has been a defining trait in the movement toward, or away from, national health care
(Morone, 2016). Political scientists often consider partisan political ideas as a catalyst to popular
choice, defining options and creating an environment where individuals can use political identity
to align with specific policy ideals (Morone, 2016). The specific role of partisanship in health
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care reform may hinder more than it helps, as the relationship between the two major political
parties, Republicans and Democrats, is changing in the contemporary period. More recent
debates around the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the future of health care under the Trump
Administration are uniquely influential in party politics (Morone, 2016).
Recent attempts at health care reform, particularly with the Obama administration,
demonstrate a trend of long-enduring, partisan policy debates. Debates that sometimes continue
long after reforms have been finalized (Morone, 2016). Opposition to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare, has continued for close to a decade, much
longer than the partisan debates that occurred with the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in the
1960s (Morone, 2016). This trend indicates that, due to enduring partisan ideals, simply passing
legislation may no longer be enough to bring closure to a period of health care reform.
The concept of bipartisan compromise on health care legislation has more or less become
a thing of the past. (Ferguson et al., 2008). During the Clinton administration, fears of outright
failure built a congressional space that involved somewhat more compromise than current or
recent congresses, which have maintained hard, party-line stances on health policy (Ferguson et
al., 2008). The result is, in essence, a race between two competing factions (Frakes, 2012). With
both Republican and Democratic groups working to develop health care reform in whatever
manner gives their party the most recognition for successful reform, sometimes to the deficit of
actual legislative progress (Ferguson et al., 2008).
Partisanship is by no means a solely governmental value or attitude. The American
public shows signs of high levels of political partisanship, especially in the years since the 2016
presidential election (Morone, 2016). The political identities of Republican or Democrat and
conservative or liberal, are labels that voters use to inform their policy opinions completely
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independent from the policy itself (Morone, 2016). This is an important phenomenon to consider
when looking at Americans historically strong support for national health care, but lack of
specific policy measures to achieve it (Ruger, 2007). Intensely heterogeneous beliefs in
Congress, the executive branch, and among the public are important divisions to take in to
account when evaluating the effectiveness of health care reform efforts in the United States.

Cynicism
The relationship between political partisanship, the federal government, and the
American public is further complicated by cynical attitudes towards government interventions
and institutions. Compared to other industrialized nations, United States residents have more
negative attitudes toward government than their international counterparts (Vladeck, 2003).
Since the 1960s, skepticism of government intervention has been increasing among the general
public (Blendon & Benson, 2001). This trend holds true for opinions on government intervention
in health care, as well (Blendon & Benson, 2001). Public support for government action in health
care has been unstable in the post-World War II period, and many Americans report some degree
of cynicism about the government’s ability to design, implement, and effectively pay for health
care reform (Blendon & Benson, 2001).
This ‘crisis of confidence’ creates issues for policymakers who have to generate
legislation that addresses current issues, garners public support, and diverts feelings of cynicism
and distrust in the government (Schlesinger, 1993). Diminishing faith in government institutions
to execute even a well-proposed piece of legislation limits the degree to which reform can
address large health policy issues. The more radical the reform, the less likely the public is to
believe that the government can execute it (Schlesinger, 1993).
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Not only do Americans believe that the government is unlikely to achieve successful
reform, they also have generally negative views on the prospect of better health care systems in
the future (Blendon et al., 1994). Negative views on the future of health care may engender more
support for the status quo, if the future is perceived as a worse unknown than present
dissatisfaction (Blendon et al., 1994). Cynicism towards the government, the current health care
system, and the potential for successful future health care outcomes has contributed to a national
tendency towards incrementalism in health care reform (Ruger, 2017).

Incrementalism
More than a value of the American people, incrementalism is a defining value of the
United States political system (Ruger, 2007). The role of incrementalism is perhaps most evident
in the historical inaction and failures of health care reform (Oberlander, 2007). A fragmented
national system of policy making, weak political parties, strong interest groups, and reelection
incentives all favor a system of incremental change (Ruger, 2007). The result is that, with the
exception of a few reforms, health care has experienced minimal change over the last 200 years
(Vladeck, 2003).
It seems that the longer the United States has gone without substantive health care
reform, the harder it has been to convince politicians, interest groups, and the American people
that health care reform is possible and maybe even necessary (Oberlander, 2007). On multiple
occasions the nation has seemed poised for health care reform only to have strong opposition,
national scandal, economic decline, or a lack of bipartisan support lead to legislation that is only
a fraction of what was originally intended (Oberlander, 2007). In many cases, sustaining the
status quo through incremental reform has seemed a better option than the risks associated with
passing large scale reform and having it fail. This phenomenon does not occur with health care
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alone (Vladeck, 2003). Preference for incremental change is built into the history and
government of this country and affects policy at every level of the political system (Vladeck,
2003). Incrementalism may not be an intentional value of policy making in the United States;
nonetheless, it has come to define a system of health care reform that is uniquely difficult to alter
and notoriously slow to change (Ruger, 2007; Oberlander, 2007).

18th & 19th Century

Health Care in Early America
The founding documents of the United States, which form the basis for policy
development, have a notable lack of any reference to health and health care. The Declaration of
Independence names an inalienable right to life that some historians and scholars interpret to
include a right to health, health care, or a basic minimum of health services (Hoffman, 2012). In
1776, when the Declaration of Independence was drafted, health was seen as a state largely
outside of human control. An individual's status of sickness or health was under the dominion of
God and deeply connected to religious devotion (Hoffman, 2012). The absence of an explicit
reference to health or health care in the Declaration of Independence may reflect the religious
values in the 18th century, though the absence has continued to affect policy development into
the modern day.
Because there was a general lack of political or constitutional direction, health care
during the 18th and 19th centuries was an informal industry with some private and some public
components (Hoffman, 2012). Prior to 1789, the newly built federal government had taken no
direct action to promote the public health or the health care industry, and a majority of
Americans received intermittent care, at best, from private medical practitioners (Hoffman,

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

11

2012). Unfortunately, this group of practitioners and their small body of medical knowledge
were unable to confront the ravages of disease that spread easily in the colonies (Shryock, 1950).
Infectious diseases like smallpox, yellow fever, and typhoid plagued the new nation in the
absence of modern day public health measures (Shryock, 1950).

John Adams (1797-1801)
The Act for the relief of sick and disabled seamen. In 1789, the federal government
introduced the nation’s first formal health care plan, The Act for the relief of sick and disabled
seamen, which provided hospital insurance to members of the United States Navy (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Collectors deducted twenty cents from the paychecks of
seamen each month to pay for the hospital care of sick and disabled seamen. The government
also used the funds from the payroll tax to build new hospitals to supply the needed medical
services (Jacobs-Kronenfeld, 2015). President John Adams and the writers of this act targeted
United States Navy workers specifically because their exposure to foreign disease-spreading
agents put them at a high risk for both contracting and propagating infectious disease (JacobsKronenfeld, 2015). This initial health care act is significant more for its existence than for its
effects on the health status of seamen. The Act for the relief of sick and disabled seamen
represents the first codified, federal health care effort in the United States (Hoffman, 2012).
While the terms of this bill may not look all that similar to the health care reform of today, it was
certainly foundational in establishing a precedent for federal intervention in health care
(Hoffman, 2012).
The next notable move in United States health care reform came during the
reconstruction period in the 1860s and 1870s, as a relatively young nation attempted to recover
from half a decade of civil war. Compounding the losses in life and infrastructure, immigration
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surged during the postbellum period (Steckle & Costs, 1997). As new immigrants came to the
United States, they brought with them new infectious diseases that flourished in increasingly
populated urban areas (Jacobs-Kronenfeld, 2015; Steckle & Costa, 1997). The distress that
burgeoning disease brought to the United States was largely attributed to new immigrants; a
direct reflection of the xenophobia that permeated American culture. These immigration and
disease patterns resulted in a new emphasis on health in the United States, federal quarantine
regulations, and the creation of public health departments at the state and community level
(Jacobs-Kronenfeld, 2015). After making an initial debut into the consciousness of the American
public and the United States government in the 18th and 19th centuries, health care would
remain at the forefront of the national agenda into modern day.

20th Century

Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921)
At the opening of the 20th century, the United States still had little in the way of a
cohesive health care system at the state or federal level (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015). During the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, scholars from a variety of fields
made new efforts to establish a bigger, better, and more regulated health care system
(Hamovitch, 1993).
The Standard Bill. In 1912, the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), a
group of economists, created the Committee on Social Insurance (CSI) with the purpose of
developing health care legislation that would support the well-being of workers. The legislation
that the AALL group drafted included specific and divisive regulations (Hamovitch, 1953).
Generally, the proposal aimed to cover low income workers and their families, as this population
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was especially vulnerable to financial crisis from illness or injury. Under the Standard Bill, these
workers and their families would gain coverage for medical care, sick pay, maternity benefits,
and funeral expenses financed through employer, employee, and state funds (Harrison, 2003).
Two portions of the Standard Bill, in particular, contributed to the numerous and heated
debates that followed the release of the initial drafts (Hamovitch, 1953). First, the AALL
believed that participation in the insurance model must be compulsory in order for the bill to be
effective. Second, the draft excluded commercial insurance companies in order to avoid the
potential for profiteering (Hamovitch, 1953). The Standard Bill was extremely partisan in a way
that is, at its root, similar to the partisanship seen in health care reform today. Support for this
piece of legislation existed on a continuum with the strongest support coming from AALL who
was largely responsible for the bill (Harrison, 2003). Opposition came in the form of influential
individuals like Samuel Gompers from the labor movement, organizations like the American
Medical Association (AMA), and organized interest groups like business owners. Opponents of
the bill cited excess government oversight, tyranny over the individual, and unacceptable
similarities to German taxation laws (Hamovitch, 1953; Harrison, 2003).
The labor movement in particular was aggressively opposed to the Standard Bill, and
would continue to oppose most efforts to reform the health care system into the next century.
Members of the labor movement largely believed that compulsory participation would reduce
worker autonomy and open opportunities for the government to prevent the formation of labor
unions (Hamovitch, 1953). The AMA feared that the bill would diminish the doctor-patient
relationship and reduce the status of doctors (Hamovitch, 1953).
In the end, the Standard Bill, like many subsequent legislative actions, was never passed.
The strength of the opposition, in membership, financing, and political sway, proved too
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powerful. This combined with the reduced support of social programs with the start of World
War I, contributed to the failure of the Standard Bill (Harrison, 2003). Forward progress on
health care would remain stalled until after World War I ended, and the nation was once again
able to focus on domestic legislative action.

Warren Harding (1921-1923)
The Harding administration entered the White House at a time of unusual progressivism
in the 20th century. The 19th amendment had just been ratified, bringing a group of well
organized, albeit white, women to the voting booths and the forefront of the national political
agenda (Lemons, 1969). Though the Harding administration was cut short by the death of
President Harding in 1923, the health care and welfare legislation of the early 1920s was an
important step toward the development of federal health care, a future emphasis on maternal and
child health, and the eventual establishment of federal welfare legislation (Lemons, 1969).
Sheppard Towner Act. A series of unique conditions made it possible for the Harding
administration to develop and pass the United States’ first federal welfare program, an early
version of federalized health care (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). The Sheppard
Towner Act sponsored by Democratic Senator Morris Sheppard and Republican Representative
Horace Mann Towner was passed in 1921. The program continued for eight years before being
allowed to lapse in 1929 (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).
The primary purpose of the Sheppard Towner Act was to reduce maternal and infant
mortality rates by increasing health and support services for pregnant women (Barker, 2003).
The main provisions of the Sheppard Towner Act included state grants to build hospitals,
provide education, and pay for nurses to treat women and infants in rural areas (Barker, 2003).
The funds made available through the bill could not, however, be used to actually pay for
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medical services (Hoffman, 2012). The Sheppard Towner Act is an excellent early example of
the tendency in american health care legislation to focus on only specialized groups like pregnant
women and children (Barker, 2003; Hoffman, 2012).
The passage of the initial Sheppard Towner Act was made possible by the weak status of
organized labor in the early 1920s, a strongly decentralized state, and well-organized women’s
groups (Barker, 2003). This combination of political and social climates allowed for the
development of what was termed at the time a ‘maternalist welfare state’. The Children’s Bureau
was initially responsible for implementing the provisions of the Sheppard Towner Act before
control was shifted to the Public Health Service (Barker, 2003). Public perception of the bill
declined after the program was moved from the Children’s Bureau, which was seen as
responsive to the needs of women and children, to the primarily male-led Public Health Service
(Baker, 2003).
Support for the bill came primarily from the women’s groups who were instrumental in
its passage (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Some organizations, and the AMA in
particular, opposed the Sheppard Towner Act, attaching the label of socialized medicine
(Maslow, 1939). Other groups refused to show support for any bill that served people of all
ethnicities, which, in theory, the Sheppard Towner act did (Barker, 2003).
Policymakers at the time identified that the Sheppard Towner Act faced an almost
impossible double-standard (Barker, 2003). If the bill had offered free medical care, fears of
socialism would have prevented its passage. If the bill had offered cash benefits, parents would
have balked at the monetization of pregnancy. The result was a bill that was too weak to enact
the kind of change that the drafters intended (Barker, 2003). Women who received social aid
under the Sheppard Towner Act expressed dissatisfaction with the weak legislation that was
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enacted because, by using an education-only framework, it inadequately addressed the actual
determinants of maternal and infant health. (Barker, 2003). Given this double standard, the
somewhat dissatisfied public response, and the initial indications of a coming economic
depression, it is unsurprising that the Sheppard Towner Act was allowed to lapse in 1929
(Maslow, 1939).

Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945)
Any discussion of health care reform under the Roosevelt administration is
simultaneously a discussion of the successes and struggles of the Social Security Act (SSA;
Hamovitch, 1953). President Roosevelt expressed explicit support of universal health care
measures, but ultimately sacrificed an attempt at universal, government-funded health care in
order to pass the SSA (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Even though health care reform
was ultimately excluded from the SSA, the Great Depression created new government interest in
health care reform.
The period immediately following the Great Depression marked the beginning of large
scale speculation into the possibility of a right to health care (Hoffman, 2012). Three senators
were particularly influential in the development of the ultimately unsuccessful legislation that
came about during this period: Democratic Senators Robert Wagner, James Murray, and John
Dingell. These senators developed two bills that were, at the time, the closest the nation had yet
come to major reform in favor of universal health care (Hamovitch, 1953; Harrison, 2003).
Wagner National Health Bill. In 1939, the Roosevelt administration created the
Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities, whose work would
eventually become the basis for the Wagner National Health Bill (Hamovitch, 1953). The writers
of the Wagner National Health Bill were heavily influenced by relevant socio-political factors,
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among them, increasing medical advancements, a new emphasis on preventative health, growing
capital for technology, and strong divisions of labor in the health field (Hamovitch, 1953). These
factors are reflected in the bill’s final provisions, many of which were highly contested (Maslow,
1939).
The Wagner National Health Bill, which was packaged as an amendment to the SSA,
included federal grants for building hospitals and other public health initiatives (Maslow, 1939).
These provisions were a reaction to conservative perspectives on social spending after the
previous decade’s economic depression (Hamovitch, 1953). In an attempt to address latent
concerns about economic insecurity in the populous, the Wagner National Health Bill sponsored
state grants to finance the expansion of existing voluntary insurance programs for low income
individuals (Maslow, 1939). The bill maintained existing systems of temporary disability
compensation and increased federal grants to fund health care for disabled children (Maslow,
1939). In many ways, the Wagner bill attempted to capitalize on the opening for social and
economic change created by the Great Depression. The bill was to be implemented primarily by
states and was left intentionally vague in the hopes of accruing fewer enemies (Hamovitch,
1953).
Despite the best efforts of the legislators, the Wagner National Health Bill was strongly
opposed by medical professionals who believed it encouraged too much government intervention
in health (Maslow, 1939). Labor groups, though they liked the content of the bill, stood opposed
because the legislation did not go far enough (Maslow, 1939). Supporters included the National
Organization for Public Health Nursing and the American Hospital Association (Maslow, 1939).
In the end, the Wagner National Health Bill never made it out of congressional hearing because
it was simultaneously too far reaching for some and not far reaching enough for others
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(Hamovitch, 1953). This dilemma of change by degrees, too much and also too little, is a theme
in health care reform and one that has contributed to the demise of numerous pieces of health
care legislation (Oberlander, 2007).
Senators Wagner, Murray, and Dingell made a second attempt at health care reform in
1943. The Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill of 1943 is distinct from the previous attempt made in
1939, but, like the other bill, was proposed as an amendment to the SSA. This bill received more
unilateral opposition and was also never passed (Harrison, 2003; “The Wagner-Murray-Dingell
Bill”, 1944).

Harry Truman (1945-1953)
After the Roosevelt administration enacted the Social Security Act without an attached
national health bill, the Truman Administration had the opportunity to bring new health care
legislation to a nation that seemed ready for vast changes in social support programs
(Hamovitch, 1953). World War II also played a key role in growing political support for national
health care legislation. About one-third of all conscripted World War II servicemen were rejected
for health problems, and many more were discharged from service for health problems unrelated
to combat (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). The establishment of a connection between
declining health and national defense increased attention on public health efforts and the health
care sector (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). President Truman viewed the lapse in
healthy servicemen as an issue of national safety. The result of those feelings was another
attempt at nationalizing health care reform (Schremmer & Knapp, 2011).
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill. In 1945, Senators Murray, Wagner, and Dingell redrafted
their 1943 bill from the Roosevelt administration and added two new and important provisions
(Harrison, 2003). The first, called Title One, increased spending on public and maternal health
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initiatives. Title Two would have established compulsory national health insurance (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). When the newly drafted Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill of 1945
first made it to Congress, the likelihood of passage seemed strong (Jacobs-Kronenfeld &
Kronenfeld, 2015). Both houses of Congress were democratically controlled, though political
and social leanings were generally more conservative in the post-war period (Schremmer &
Knapp, 2011). The high taxes and strong government oversight that characterized New Deal
legislation in the period after the Great Depression no longer had strong public support in the
1940s, opening an opportunity for increased social spending (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015). Debate on the bill continued in committee until the midterm elections of 1946, in which
the Republican Party gained majorities in both houses. Passage of a broad, compulsory, and
expensive piece of federal legislation became less likely with the government under strong
Republican control (Schremmer & Knapp, 2011).
Despite the conservative control in Congress, Truman ran for reelection in 1948 with
nation health insurance as a major focus of his campaign. When Truman won his reelection, the
Democratic Party also regained Congressional control (Schremmer & Knapp, 2011). The
passage of national health legislation seemed imminent (Schremmer & Knapp, 2011). In
response to growing public and political support for the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill of 1945,
the AMA launched a massive anti-national health insurance campaign in 1948 (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). The organization claimed that Truman’s plan was “socialized
medicine”, a label that proved particularly incendiary in the staunchly anti-communist period
after World War II. The AMA spent $4 million to lobby the public and Congress. It was, at the
time, the largest lobbying campaign in history (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015;
Schremmer & Knapp, 2011). Like other major players in the health care debate, the AMA

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

20

preferred a private health care system over the compulsory and government run system that the
Truman administration promoted (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015.
Reactions to the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill of 1945 revealed four primary beliefs in
oppositions to universal health care: universal health care would be a handout, wealthy
Americans would receive unnecessary assistance, it would create more need than the medical
infrastructure could support, and federal control of doctors would ruin the doctor-patient
relationship (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). These four beliefs in combination with
the political and economic power of the AMA, waning public support, and the start of the
Korean War contributed to the ultimate failure of the second iteration of the Wagner-MurrayDingell Bill of 1945 (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).
Looking back on the failure of the Truman Administration’s “socialized medicine”
reform efforts, many of the issues that sank national health insurance in the 1940s are still
absolutely relevant today (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). In particular, the public’s
concern about health care handouts and the medical infrastructure would continue to appear in
the health care debate for decades to come (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).

John Kennedy (1962-1963)
During the 1950s, the United States government made a concerted effort to develop the
private insurance market (Zelizer, 2015). Businesses received subsidies for offering insurance to
their employees, and many Americans enrolled with a private insurer through their employers
(Zelizer, 2015). Even with this new, informal system of private insurance and Social Security
benefits, many Americans struggled to pay for their health care costs. This was especially true
for the elderly who spend more on hospital care than other age groups and tend to have lower
incomes (Zelizer, 2015). Medical advancements during the middle of the 20th century
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accelerated rates of hospitalization and brought the issue of health care for older Americans to
the forefront of national and congressional agendas (Zelizer, 2015).
Forand Bill. In 1958, the Kennedy administration began a seven-year movement toward
federally run insurance programs that would eventually end with the formation of Medicare and
Medicaid under President Johnson (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). The Forand Bill
aimed to cover hospital insurance for the elderly with an amendment to the SSA (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Aimes Forand and Cecil King, the primary drafters, proposed
that Social Security benefits be expanded to include hospital care for people over the age of 65.
The new expenses would be funded with an increase in the existing Social Security tax (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Organized labor, which was especially powerful during this
period of unionization, strongly supported the bill (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). A
majority of Democrats in Congress and President Kennedy also came out in support of the
Forand Bill (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). With backing from the president, the
White House began a series of public-relations promotions for the SSA amendment (Zelizer,
2011). Soon after, the AMA launched an aggressive oppositional campaign in conjunction with
Ronald Reagan and a group of insurance companies (Zelizer, 2011).
In contrast to previous unsuccessful attempts at health care reform, the end of the Forand
Bill has been credited not to large lobbying organizations like the AMA, but rather to
Democratic Senator and Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills
(Zelizer, 2015). The high projected cost of the Forand Bill was not something that Mills, a strict
fiscal conservative, promoted. As Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Mills
had control over what could go to a vote in committee, as well as committee assignments
(Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Mills used his power as Chairman to repeatedly block
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the Forand Bill from a vote. While the Forand Bill languished in committee, more conservative
members of congress developed and promoted alternative bills including the Kerr-Mills Bill, a
limited means-tested program, and the King-Anderson Bill, a weaker version of the original
Forand Bill (Zelizer, 2015). As of 1962, none of the three primary proposals had made it out of
committee. Then in 1963, the assassination of President Kennedy halted the movement towards
what would be Medicare and Medicaid legislation until President Johnson took office (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).

Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969)
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation is one of the hallmark achievements of
the Johnson administration and of the 20th century as a whole (Berkowitz, 2005). Johnson’s
“Great Society” programs formed a solid foundation for the passage of social support legislation
in the 1960s (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Jacobs, 2015). With the progress made under the Kennedy
administration, Presidents Johnson and the 89th Congress were prepared to enact legislative
change during this period.
Medicare. In contrast with the rough beginnings of the Forand Bill under Kennedy,
Medicare legislation passed relatively quickly after Johnson’s election. With the 1962 elections,
Johnson entered the oval office and the Democratic Party gained majorities in both the House
and the Senate (Berkowitz, 2005). This shift in the political leanings of the executive and
legislative branches paved the way for structural changes to the committee process that would
eventually permit the passage of Medicare legislation (Berkowitz, 2005). The first of these
structural changes to the committee system was the reconfiguration of the House Ways and
Means Committee to make bipartisan review easier to achieve. The second change was the
enactment of a 21-day limit on the review of a bill in committee (Jacobs-Kronenfeld &
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Kronenfeld, 2015). Under these new conditions, Medicare legislation passed relatively quickly,
especially when compared to the multi-year battle of the nearly equivalent Forand Bill (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).
The bill that eventually made it through Congress as Medicare combined aspects of the
Forand Bill with elements of the King-Anderson and Kerr-Mills Bills previously mentioned, as
well as a program promoted by the AMA titled Eldercare (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015). Even with extensive reconfiguring of the final bill to incorporate elements from each of
the main partisan bills, support for Medicare legislation fell along party lines (Moore & Smith,
2005). With Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate, Medicare passed on July
30th, 1965 as Title XVIII of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (Jacobs-Kronenfeld &
Kronenfeld, 2015; Moore & Smith, 2005).
Medicare has become a staple of the American health care system, but current Medicare
legislation is notably different from the original 1965 version. The flexibility of Medicare
legislation has been key to its continued success, as the program has needed to grow and expand
with an increasingly large 65 and over population, new medical advancements, and increases in
the demand for medical services (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016).
Medicaid. In 1965, the 89th United States Congress also passed Medicaid legislation as
Title XIX of the 1965 Social Security Amendments. The same issues that plagued the passage of
Medicare as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 afflicted the passage of Medicaid
Legislation, though Medicaid was often seen as a secondary piece of legislation (Berkowitz,
2005). When Medicaid final made it out of congress with approval, the program was still highly
divisive and has remained so for the last fifty years (Rosenbaum, 2002).
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The aim of the Medicaid program was to help states finance means-tested health
initiatives to support low-income families. Legislators were incentivized to cede more authority
to states to allow for greater flexibility in government supported health care and minimize federal
control (Rosenbaum, 2002). The primary beneficiaries are low-income families, individuals with
disabilities, and dual enrolled Medicare beneficiaries. Medicaid was originally structured as an
entitlement program through state and federal funding (Rosenbaum, 2002). Because the program
is an entitlement, anyone who meets the requirements is eligible to receive aid. While the
entitlement status of Medicaid allows some flexibility in how programming is implemented,
federal Medicaid laws are relatively stringent to reduce financial risk (Jacobs-Kronenfeld &
Kronenfeld, 2015). Much like Medicare, the way in which Medicaid was structured has allowed
the program to be incredibly adaptable over the last 50 years (Moore & Smith, 2005).
Medicaid’s adaptability stems from two primary provisions: waiver programs and
entitlement programs (Moore & Smith, 2005). The waiver program allows states to make
Medicaid reform decisions as need changes. This, in combination with the structure as an
entitlement program, has allowed Medicaid to expand with the growing population, increased
need, increased medical expenses, advancements in care, and political changes (Moore & Smith,
2005).
Despite its adaptability, Medicaid is still limited in its scope. The application process is
infamously difficult, definitions of disability are specific, and participation among physicians has
always been low (Grogan, 1994). The program also only serves a specific and limited segment of
the population. The many expansions of Medicaid services have never included low-income
adults without children or disability, and this has been a notable absence since Medicaid
legislation first made it through Congress (Moore & Smith, 2005). Additionally, Medicaid’s
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status as welfare legislation has been a main weakness of the program since its inception (Moore
& Smith, 2005). However, Medicaid’s identity as a welfare program has become more tenuous
over time. As Medicaid has expanded to include more Americans, and Americans from higherincome brackets that have not traditionally used social support services, perceptions of Medicaid
as a welfare service have been challenged (Moore & Smith, 2005).
Despite the challenges that Medicare and Medicaid have faced both in their initiation and
over the past fifty years, the programs continue to insure millions of Americans, offering
essential access to health services (Moore & Smith, 2005). The status of these social insurance
programs will remain in question as new health care reformers must decide whether to simply
modify these existing programs or completely eliminate Medicaid and Medicare from new
legislation (Berkowitz, 2005).

Richard Nixon (1969-1974)
Nixon’s presidency was defined by the Watergate scandal and his subsequent resignation.
Much of the legislation pending in Congress in 1974 when Watergate broke became a victim of
legislative inaction during this period, as all potential for political action was overshadowed by
scandal (Wainess, 1999). Among the legislation that stalled in Congress in 1974 were multiple
comprehensive national health insurance bills that seemed poised for success (Wainess, 1999).
Scholars have posited that had Watergate not occurred under the Nixon administration, the
United States would likely have obtained national health insurance before the midpoint of the
1970s (Wainess, 1999; Harrison, 2003).
National Health Insurance Partnership Act. A slew of unique conditions at the
opening of the 1970s created an environment in which support for health care reform proliferated
(Wainess, 1999). Health care expenses had been growing consistently since the passage of

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

26

Medicaid and Medicare ten years earlier. In 1974, price controls on both federal programs lifted
causing expenditures to increase at alarming rates (Wainess, 1999). There were Democratic
majorities in both the House and the Senate, but in general, both Nixon and Congress were more
moderate than past governments (Wainess, 1999; Freed, 2015). Additionally, the House Ways
and Means Committee did not have subcommittees during this period; subsequently, power was
highly centralized, and legislation moved quickly. Under these conditions, the 93rd Congress
gained more momentum towards developing successful national health insurance legislation than
possibly any other government in United States’ history (Wainess, 1999).
Taking advantage of this momentum and the mutual desire among Democrats and
Republicans to move legislation quickly and receive credit for its passage, congresspersons
began proposing reforms early in the decade (Wainess, 1999). The first major effort among these
proposals was the Health Security Act of 1971, sponsored by Senators Ted Kennedy and Martha
Griffiths. The bill was essentially a push for comprehensive national insurance, but the
legislation appeared too much like a single-payer program to gain congressional and presidential
support (Harrison, 2003). Ted Kennedy would be an important player in the health care reform
debate for many years, and he is viewed, today, as an early and aggressive supporter of universal
health care on the national stage (Wainess, 1999).
As the proposed Health Security Act was under review in Congress, Russell Long, Chair
of the Senate Finance Committee, was working on a piece of near-universal, catastrophic-care
legislation in conjunction with Senator Abraham Ribicoff (Harrison, 2003). The 1973 LongRibicoff Bill gained strong committee support but was viewed as too limited to be success in the
Senate (Harrison, 2003). In 1974, two more comprehensive health care plans were added to the
congressional docket: Nixon’s National Health Insurance Partnership Act and a proposal out of
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the House, the Kennedy-Mills Bill. Both pieces of legislation were serious contenders in the race
toward universal health care (Freed & Das, 2015).
The content of the various reform proposals varied largely in benefits, coverage, and
administration (Freed & Das, 2015). Many of the potential bills advocated for employer-based
insurance with some supplementary system for the unemployed and the elderly, but they differed
dramatically in what would be covered. The proposal headed by Senator Long offered
substantially less coverage that the more comprehensive bills supported by Kennedy and Nixon
(Harrison, 2003). The proposals also differed in the degree of government involvement, with
some emphasizing private insurers and others aiming to increase the role of the federal
government (Harrison, 2003). Notably, and also controversial, some of the plans intended to
eliminate Medicaid and replace it with other, less costly systems (Wainess, 1999). The actual
contents of these health care bills was definitively more important than the details of past reform
attempts (Bodenheimer, 2003). The nation seemed poised to pass national health care legislation,
and the matter at hand was what exactly that legislation would look like (Bodenheimer, 2003).
During this period, the AMA and organized labor both influenced the creation of
proposals to reflect their organizational values (Wainess, 1999). These proposals, while generally
less popular, were added to a growing list of what would be seven major proposals for health
care reform before Congress in 1974 (Wainess, 1999). With so many options, it seemed likely
that the United States would have a serious bid for national health insurance. That was until
Watergate created massive scandal in the Nixon administration, with the end result being
Nixon’s resignation and a long-lasting mistrust of congressional and presidential power (JacobsKronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).
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When former Vice President Ford took over after Nixon’s resignation, there was still
some hope that national health insurance would be realized in the 1970’s; however, Ford had a
history of voting against social legislation (Wainess, 1999). During his previous terms as a
congressperson, Ford voted against every single piece of welfare and health legislation that came
before the House. Despite his less than optimistic voting history, out of loyalty to Nixon, Ford
proclaimed his support for the National Health Insurance Partnership Act (Wainess, 1999). After
much debate in Congress, a compromise bill termed the Committee Print actually gained a
majority in the House Ways and Means Committee, but only a one-vote majority (Wainess,
1999). The committee chair, Wilbur Mills, opted not to bring a bill with such marginal support
before the floor (Wainess, 1999). Soon after this, Mills resigned from his committee position and
left Congress amid a scandal involving a substance-use disorder and an assault on a relatively
well-known sex worker (Wainess, 1999).
Without Mills’ strong leadership, the House Ways and Means Committee failed to make
any more progress on national health insurance compromise (Wainess, 1999). The ‘Watergate
Babies’, congresspersons elected immediately after Watergate in 1974, were less prone to
bipartisanship than their predecessors and quickly dismantled the axis of power that had formed
around the House Ways and Means Committee under Mills. The result was seven bills for
national health care reform languishing in committee that would never make it onto the
Congressional floor, much less into law (Wainess, 1999; Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015).
The 1970s introduced a new issue to the discussion of health care reform. Prior to this
period, the health care debate was largely between proponents and opponents of governmental
health care (Bodenheimer, 2003). During the 1970s, the nation transitioned from this dichotomy
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into a more complex discussion of how national health care could be achieved and not simply
whether it should be achieved (Bodenheimer, 2003). This trend has persisted to influence much
of the health care reform that has occurred since the 1970s.

James Carter (1977-1981)
President Carter made health care a priority issue in his 1976 campaign, and he was quick
to begin developing proposals after taking office (Finow, 1998). In the wake of Watergate and
the failures of health reform under Ford, the Carter administration faced significant political and
economic challenges (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Congress was generally
distrustful of executive power during this period, so despite having Democratic majorities in
Congress and a Democratic president, the administration struggled to transfer political aims into
actual legislation (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). The late 1970s and the 1980s were
marked by a strong desire to increase industry competition and reduce regulations on business in
an attempt to encourage fiscal restraint and reduce inflation (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015). Under these conditions, lawmakers made multiple attempts to develop national health
reform legislation, but divisive views in Congress, economic pressures, and political mistrust
prevented forward progress (Finbow, 1998).
National Health Plan. President Carter contributed to numerous national health
insurance proposals during his time in office (Finbow, 1998). Initially, he was adamant in his
support for a mass reform to create a universal health care system, but these sentiments faded as
fears of inflation and politically inflammatory legislation took hold (Finbow, 1998). In the end,
politicians drafted and debated two primary bills. The first was a comprehensive, immediate
reform bill sponsored by Joseph Califano Jr., Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Finbow, 1998). Califano had the support of organized labor, a group that had been
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demanding immediate and total reform for decades (Finbow, 1998). The other bill was a
universal catastrophic care plan, reminiscent of the one introduced under Nixon, and supported
by White House officials like Senator Russell Long (Finbow, 1998).
In 1979, with President Carter’s influence, the National Health Plan made it before
Congress as a piece of incremental legislation to expand Medicaid and provide employee-based
catastrophic coverage (Finbow, 1998). Carter and supporters of the bill were clear in their belief
that the proposal was not a commitment to creating comprehensive health care in the future
(Finbow, 1998). In Congress, the bill was stripped of many provisions that conservative
members saw as welfare benefits (Finbow, 1998). Few Congresspersons actually supported the
final version of the bill, which was seen as too expansive for most Republicans and some
conservative Democrats and too weak for most liberal Democrats (Finbow, 1998).
Similar to some past legislative efforts, national health reform failed during the Carter
administration for a multitude of reasons (Finbow, 1998; Bodenheimer, 2003). Chief among
these was the ideological debate between incremental reform, which was associated with fiscal
responsibility, and comprehensive reform. This debate has repeatedly ended in bills that are
simultaneously too expansive and not expansive enough (Finbow, 1998; Bodenheimer, 2003).
The failure of legislation during this period also exemplifies the long-lasting effect of Watergate
on the political climate, and particularly the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015). Some scholars have posited that residual
distrust from the Watergate Scandal negatively impacted the outcome of reform attempts in the
late 1970s, as the government was more concerned with anti-inflammatory politics than with
legislative overhauls (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015; Finbow, 1998).
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William Clinton (1993-2001)
The early 1990s had the appearance of an era in which major health care reform would be
not only possible, but probable in the United States (Skocpol, 1994). Health care expenses were
increasing at previously unknown rates, and a record 40 million Americans were uninsured
(Budetti, 2004). Under the advisement of the President’s Task Force on National Health Reform,
the Clinton administration actually came fairly close to achieving massive change to a system
that was described by some at the time as “huge and unwieldy” (Skocpol, 1994). Despite the
eventual failure of this health care reform attempt, the Clinton administration would go on to
create the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996 and the current
State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997. Both programs have had significant and
measurable impacts on the health care delivery system in the United States (Jacobs-Kronenfeld
& Kronenfeld, 2015).
Health Security Act. Soon after his election, President Clinton initiated the President’s
Task Force on National Health Reform, also known as the Health Security Task Force (HSTF).
At the helm of this new legislative group was First Lady Hillary Clinton (Jacobs-Kronenfeld &
Kronenfeld, 2015). The HSTF developed and drafted the 1993 Clinton Health Care Act, also
known as the Health Security Act (HSA). This was a landmark piece of legislation that forsook
the more incremental proposals of the past for rapid and far reaching reform (Harrison, 2003).
The proposed HSA included provisions for a government regulated system of managed
competition. By grouping insurers into large cooperatives, the bill aimed to disperse risk and
reduce the total number of private insurance companies (Harrison, 2003). It is important to note
that at this time, health care was as much a private entity, through employer insurance, as it was
a public entity, through programs like Medicaid and Medicare (Skocpol, 1994).
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In order for the managed competition plan to work, the bill also included an individual
mandate, a mandatory minimum of coverage, and subsidies for employers and low-income or
unemployed individuals. In response to increasing costs, the HSA opted to privatize Medicaid by
including beneficiaries in the provision for general health care plans (Budetti, 2004). In theory,
this would have dispersed some of the financial risk associated with the Medicaid program and
also increased the number of clinicians accepting Medicaid recipients. Clinicians would receive
the same reimbursements for Medicaid patients as for non-Medicaid patients (Budetti, 2004).
There has been rampant speculation as to why the HSA was not a success, and many of the
proposed theories have as much to do with the political and social climate in 1993 as the actual
contents of the bill (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld, 2015).
President Clinton took office as a Democrat in the wake of ten years of Republican
presidency, having defeated an incumbent president, and having won a minority of the electorate
(Skocpol, 1994). Despite strong partisanship in Congress and somewhat low public support, the
Clinton administration undertook truly monumental reforms (Skocpol, 1994). Some scholars
have surmised that Clinton would have been more successful taking a less aggressive and more
incremental approach, but history would indicate that incrementalism comes with its own
difficulties (Blendon, Brodie, & Bendon, 1995). While a majority of Americans were likely in
support of national-scale health care reform, approaching reform through the HSTF may have
created too much distance between the policymakers and the policy beneficiaries. A public
perception of a lack of transparency likely reduced overall support for the bill (Blendon et al.,
1995).
In 1993, Congress had Democratic majorities in both houses; however, these majorities
were not strong enough to ensure the passage of health care legislation (Skocpol, 1994).
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Republican congresspersons supported the goal of decreasing the number of uninsured
Americans, but similar to past legislative attempts, they were generally apprehensive to support
such a major accomplishment under a Democratic President (Jacobs-Kronenfeld & Kronenfeld,
2015). The political climate in 1993 was not conducive to congressional action, and the social
conditions at the time may have inhibited progression of the HSA to a similar extent (Skocpol,
1994).
In the early 1990s, the public was generally skeptical of government control and
increasing bureaucracy. The HSA with its managed competition provision would have increased
bureaucratic control of the health care economy to an extent that was unacceptable to the public
at the time (Skocpol, 1994). Much like researchers who suggested an incremental plan may have
been more successful, other scholars have posited that a single-payer plan would have been a
better response to the bureaucratic fears of the public (Skocpol, 1994).
In 1994, the HSA was declared unpassable in the current Congress, and Senate leaders
planned to delay passage of the bill until after midterm elections (Harrison, 2003). The
Republican Revolution of 1994, led in part by Newt Gingrich, made the passage of the HSA or
even a compromise bill a nearly impossible scenario with the 104th congress (Harrison, 2003).
The growth of Republican control in Congress, political speculation as to the role of Hillary
Clinton in the HSTF, and the break of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal in 1998 more or less
guaranteed the failure of national health care reform under the Clinton administration (Harrison,
2003). Though, the administration would go on to develop more successful health care
legislation at the state level.
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
was established as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and the program has operated
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continuously ever since (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015). SCHIP was created
in response to the growing number of uninsured children in the United States in the mid-1990s
(Shields, McGinn-Shapiro, & Fronstin, 2008). The proposed audience was children in families
with an income above 100% the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). The provisions of the bill allowed
states flexibility in deciding the degree to which they wanted to expand coverage to uninsured
children, with the federal cap set at 200% of the FPL (Shields et al., 2008).
In order to achieve this flexibility, the bill is executed as a block grant. Block grants are
funds given to states for a specific purpose provided that states meet federally mandated
minimum benefit and coverage requirements (Rosenbaum, 2002). Providing greater control to
states is seen as an essential characteristic of SCHIP, but the block grant status makes the
continued funding of the bill tenuous (Shields et al., 2008). Many states have been forced to cut
funding to other social programs to maintain SCHIP. In 2017, the tenuous status of SCHIP
became glaringly clear when Congress nearly failed to continue funding the program (Rovner,
2018).

21st Century

George W. Bush (2001-2009)
Between 2000-2007, the cost of health benefits nearly doubled, but the average worker’s
wages increased by less than 25%. The growing costs of health care and insurance premiums
were too much for many individuals and families to manage (Shields et al., 2008). In particular,
those who worked for employers that did not provide health insurance, were ineligible for the
insurance their employer offered, or were unable to pay for the offered insurance plans were
becoming uninsured at an increasing rate (Shields et al., 2008). Financial concerns and high costs
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were the defining characteristics of the reform efforts during this period (Shields et al., 2008).
Despite the emphasis on reducing health care expenses, the Bush administration was relatively
successful in pushing health care legislation through Congress (Oliver, Lee, & Lipton, 2004).
Health Savings Accounts. While not a specific health care reform effort, the Bush
administration heavily promoted Health Savings Accounts as a potential solution to skyrocketing
health care costs (Hoffman, 2006). Health Savings Accounts allow enrollees to open a private,
tax-deductible savings account to be used exclusively for health care costs. These accounts are
often accompanied by high deductible plans with especially low premiums (Hoffman, 2006).
These plans were and are particularly attractive to low-income individuals, but they generally
offer minimal coverage (Hoffman, 2006). Health Savings Accounts combined with high
deductible health plans were very popular in the early and mid-2000s, but enrollees in these
plans reported medical bill problems like inability to pay for tests or medications at much higher
rates than individuals enrolled in other health plans (Hoffman, 2006). Nevertheless, Health
Savings Accounts formed the foundation of health care under the Bush administration as
skyrocketing costs forced beneficiaries to enroll in lower cost, more catastrophic-care plans.
Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability Initiative. Soon after his initial
election in 2001, President Bush announced the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability
Initiative (HIFA; Rosenbaum, 2002). HIFA gave states the option to offer minimum health care
coverage to individuals that were uninsured but did not qualify for Medicaid. This provision
contributed to an increase in the insured population but came at the expense of the quality of
benefits packages (Rosenbaum, 2002). In order to pay for the minimum benefits expansion,
states had the option to reduce coverage for the existing population of Medicaid beneficiaries. In
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the end, HIFA decreased the proportion of uninsured individuals nationally, but led to substantial
losses in coverage for many Medicaid enrollees (Rosenbaum, 2002).
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act. A large portion
of the growing medical costs during this period were attributed to Medicare, and more
specifically, growing prescription drug costs among Medicare enrollees (Oliver et al., 2004). The
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) was the Bush
administration’s attempt to reduce the burden of prescription drug costs on the elderly
(Brinckerhoff & Coleman, 2005).
The MMA became law in 2003 after a tumultuous six months in Congress (Oliver et al.,
2004). The bill set income and eligibility requirements for Medicare beneficiaries, and provided
reduced prescription drug prices for those who qualified through the newly created Medicare
Part D (Brinckerhoff & Coleman, 2005). Policy analysts and Medicare recipients expressed
discontent with two aspects of the MMA (Brinckerhoff & Coleman, 2005). The first issue was
deciding which prescriptions would be covered under the MMA. Consistent with the language of
the original Medicare legislation, the MMA aimed to cover prescriptions that were considered
necessary and reasonable. The clear question that emerges from that policy statement is what
qualifies as necessary and reasonable (Brinckerhoff & Coleman, 2005). The second oft-cited
issue with the MMA is a clear absence of coverage for those who did not qualify under the
MMA, but who were still unable to pay for prescriptions in full. This group was a substantial and
important part of the Medicare population that continued to struggle even after the MMA
claimed to have made prescriptions more accessible for the elderly (Brinckerhoff & Coleman,
2005).
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Barack Obama (2008-2017)
In 2008, the political and economic landscape in the United States was poised for major
health care reform (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). It had been nearly fifty years since any major
health care reform had passed in the United States when President Obama won the 2008 election
by a substantial margin and with strong public support. Additionally, Democrats grew their
majorities in both the House and the Senate in the 2008 election (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011).
President Obama maintained high public approval ratings through 2008 and into 2009, and the
administration also had success in passing major legislation early on with the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011).
The passage of health care legislation under these conditions was not, however,
guaranteed. The economic recession threatened health care reform, as policy makers were
cautious to increase spending on top of the already pricey stimulus package (Skocpol &
Williamson, 2011). Another setback came in 2009 with the special election of Scott Brown in
Massachusetts. In this special election, the Democrats lost what many considered to be a fool
proof supermajority in Congress (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). Lobbying groups also
threatened the future of health care reform, as private insurance companies, clinicians, and
hospital groups were profiting well under the current system. Even with this opposition, the
Obama administration and 111th Congress would go on to pass comprehensive health care
legislation in 2010 (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In order to achieve health care reform, the
Obama administration outlined general principles and objectives. They then transferred the role
of developing detailed policy initiatives to Congress (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). By limiting
the role of the democratically controlled executive branch in the policy process, the Obama
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administration hoped to encourage bipartisanship and compromise (Skocpol & Williamson,
2010). The resulting bill was termed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
commonly known as Obamacare.
Since its passage, there has been a wealth of speculation as to why the ACA passed when
so many other bills did not. In addition to the political and social factors that prepared the Obama
administration to achieve this success, the bill was also intentionally written to address the many
concerns of the very vocal opposition. The ACA included a provision specifically to address the
guaranteed opposition from lobbying groups and physicians who feared losing profits under a
changing system (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). The Obama administration also directly
addressed the economic concerns voiced by politicians and the public alike. In its
communication with the public and lobbying groups, the Obama administration chose to
emphasize how the bill would be paid for more than the actual contents of the legislation. The
Congressional Budget Office had a substantial role in the evaluation of the drafted ACA
legislation and was key to the economic arguments for radical health care reform (Skocpol &
Williamson, 2011). In 2010, the 111th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act as a budget reconciliation bill without a single Republican vote (Jacobs & Callaghan,
2013).
In its final form, the ACA is a well over 2,000-page document. The sheer quantity of
information can be condensed into seven main provisions that appear to have been the most
influential and controversial (Glied & Jackson, 2017; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
2015; Skocpol & Williamson, 2011; Jacob & Callaghan, 2013).
1. Insurers are not able to deny coverage to individuals or their dependents based on a preexisting health condition.
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2. Policies must meet a minimum of coverage, which includes ten essential benefits.
3. An individual mandate requires that individuals enroll in health insurance or pay an
annual fee.
4. Health insurance exchanges create a central location for individuals not enrolled in
employer or government insurance to find a health care plan.
5. Qualifying individuals and families that do not meet Medicaid eligibility can receive
subsidies to pay for health care plans on the exchanges.
6. An employer mandate requires that employers of a certain size offer insurance for their
employees.
7. Medicaid expansion permits states to increase the proportion of low-income families that
can enroll in government insurance.
Among these seven main provisions, the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion
have been the most controversial. After the ACA was passed, states were quick to identify these
provisions as potential points for judicial debate (Glied & Jackson, 2017). The controversy
surrounding these supposed constitutional breaches was taken to the Supreme Court soon after
the passage of the ACA. In the case National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v.
Sebelius, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of both the individual mandate and
Medicaid expansion (Glied & Jackson, 2017).
The primary objective of the individual mandate is to encourage populations that have
electively forgone insurance in the past, like young people, to enroll and maintain insurance
(Glied & Jackson, 2017). Having more young, healthy individuals in the insurance pool reduces
overall risk and expense. Arguments against the individual mandate assert that requirements to
enroll in health insurance are an infringement on individual rights and an overextension of the
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allowances of the Commerce Clause (Glied & Jackson, 2017). In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme
Court ruled that the individual mandate was both constitutional and a valid exercise of
congressional taxing power (Glied & Jackson, 2017). The arguments around Medicaid were
slightly more complicated and resulted in a more complex response from the Supreme Court.
By expanding Medicaid, the ACA aimed to increase the number of low-income families
receiving health insurance through the government (Glied & Jackson, 2017). Originally, the
ACA required that states expand Medicaid up to a certain percentage of the FPL or have federal
funding for their existing Medicaid programs revoked (Glied & Jackson, 2017). In the same
court case, NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court ruled that Medicaid expansion as written was
overly coercive to the states. However, a second majority of justices ruled that limiting the power
of the federal government to enforce the legislation would effectively negate the coercion
without eliminating the legislation as a whole (Glied & Jackson, 2017). The court case
essentially made Medicaid expansion optional, because states could opt out of expansion without
losing all of their federal Medicaid funding (Glied & Jackson, 2017).
The tumultuous judicial beginnings of the ACA are just one indication of the controversy
surrounding Obama era health care reform. As much as debates about American values and
patient autonomy have come to define ACA implementation, the associated outcomes have been
largely positive (Glied & Jackson, 2017). The total number of uninsured has dropped from about
44 million in 2013 to an estimated 27.6 million in 2016. The nonelderly uninsured rate dropped
from 18.2% in 2010 to just 10.3% in 2016 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Recent research
estimates that in addition to increases in the insured population, the ACA has saved Medicare
recipients $2.1 billion on prescription drugs and general consumers anther $1.2 billion in reduced
premiums (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015).
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Approximately two-thirds of the growth in the insured population has been attributed to
Medicaid expansion; however, increases are not equally distributed nationally (Jacobs &
Callaghan, 2013). Few Republican states have begun the process of expanding Medicaid, which
leaves some residents, who would be eligible for Medicaid in other states, uninsured. In many
cases, low-income, uninsured families would be eligible if they moved just one state away, from
Missouri to Iowa or from Mississippi to Arkansas (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013). The
inconsistencies in expansion status are exacerbated by the hesitancy of many of the poorest states
to take on the payment of 4% of Medicaid costs after federal funding reduces to 96% from 100%
three years after expansion (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013). The patterns of expansion
disproportionately affect African Americans in Southern states, where eligibility can be as low as
44% of the FPL, and undocumented immigrants who remain ineligible for government insurance
(Rowland & Lyons, 2016). In addition to these groups, about 30% of individuals who are
uninsured report being uninsured because they fall into a well-defined coverage gap populated
by individuals who make too much to qualify for Medicaid, but not enough to afford marketplace
insurance (Rowlands & Lyons, 2016).
The insurance gap is just one of many problems that the ACA has faced since 2010.
Marketplaces were fraught with technical difficulties and remain underpopulated by insurers and
consumers alike (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Lower competition has allowed premiums to
remain at higher rates than were initially predicted (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Many
nonelderly adults remain uninsured despite the individual mandate and associated penalty
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Outlandish and untrue claims about fake policy initiatives
like “death panels” have become pervasive and influential. Even the popular moniker
“Obamacare” has haunted the ACA as partisanship burgeoned with the 2016 election and “repeal
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and replace” became the anthem of the opposition (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). While it is
true that some Americans are worse off under the ACA and roll out has been bogged down by
challenges, on the whole, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represents one of the
largest and most comprehensive pieces of health care reform in the nation’s history (Skocpol &
Williamson, 2017).

Donald Trump (2017-present)
The 2016 presidential race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton was both chaotic
and controversial. As policy issues like global warming, economic inequality, police brutality,
and cybersecurity filled the news, voters were left largely uninformed about the candidates’
opinions on health care reform (Hatcher & Vick, 2017). “Repeal and replace” came to define the
Republican position on health care reform, while the Hillary Clinton’s campaign emphasized
loose policy aims like access to mental health services and rising health care costs (Hatcher &
Vick, 2017). The lack of health-related communication on the part of the 2016 presidential
candidates was representative of a general lack of attention to public health issues (Hatcher &
Vick, 2017). When Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election with minority support
from Americans, the nation was quick to express concern about the future of health care under an
administration that lacked clear policies and had a penchant for radical subjectivity (Allcorn &
Stein, 2017). Increasing concerns over health care would plague the initial years of the Trump
administration.
American Health Care Act. The nation’s most recent attempt at health care reform
came in 2017 in the form of the American Health Care Act (AHCA). Speaker of the House, Paul
Ryan, led the Trump administration in their promise to “repeal and replace” the ACA
(Rudalevige, 2017). This promise was foundational to Donald Trump’s campaign in the 2016
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presidential election and was key to his popularity with certain constituencies. The status of the
ACA as a budget reconciliation act makes it difficult to alter, much less repeal; however, the
contents of the AHCA would have undone many ACA provisions (Rudalevige, 2017).
The basis for the AHCA was refundable tax credits, similar to the subsidies under the
ACA, but based on age rather than income. The tax credit would vary between $2,000 and
$4,000 in value, with older Americans receiving larger tax credits (Wilensky, 2017). Under the
AHCA, Medicaid would be largely defederalized and given back to the states as a block grant
(Wilensky, 2017). This would be a major transition from the recent Medicaid expansions under
the ACA that provide federal aid at a rate of about 95%, to federal aid at a rate closer to 50%
(Wilensky, 2017). The bill would allow insurers to reduce benefits for many plans and eliminate
the formal ban on refusing coverage due to a pre-existing condition (Abelson & Thomas, 2017).
Individuals that experience lapses in insurance coverage would pay a surcharge of about 30%
upon re-enrollment. This provision would replace the individual mandate, ideally without the
associated limits on personal freedom (Abelson & Thomas, 2017).
Initial evaluations of the AHCA were less than complementary. The Congressional
Budget Office estimated that 23 million Americans would become uninsured by 2026, and
Medicaid spending would decrease by more than $830 billion (Wilensky, 2017). These changes
would be joined by a slight decline in premiums and a deficit reduction of approximately $120
billion (Wilensky, 2017). Support for the plan came almost exclusively from the Republican
Party, with opposition coming from many Democrats, hospital associations, and physicians
(Abelson & Thomas, 2017). Reductions in Medicaid and Medicare spending would likely result
in many current beneficiaries losing coverage, and these beneficiaries make up large portions of
hospital and physician patients (Abelson & Thomas, 2017).

FAILURE TO LAUNCH

44

On May 4th, 2017, the AHCA passed in the House of Representatives without a single
Democratic vote or the votes of 20 Republican representatives; however, the bill fell apart on the
Senate floor and failed to pass with a majority vote (Wilensky, 2017). The end of the AHCA
seemed inevitable to many given the strong opposition to its provisions and the growing annual
support for the ACA (Rudalevige, 2017). The failure of the AHCA may be linked to a lack of
clear direction, a deeply divided Republican Party, and the fact that “repeal and replace” is not a
strong platform on which to develop concrete policies (Rudalevige, 2017). Record low
presidential approval may have also made passage more difficult, despite efforts on behalf of the
White House to distance President Trump from the AHCA (Rudalevige, 2017). The Trump
administration has failed to make major health reform in the United States so far, and Americans
are left wondering what is next for health care in this nation.

The Future
The future of health care in the United States is uncertain. There is little consensus among
public health officials, policy analysts, and lawmakers on what the health care system will look
like in two, five, or even ten years (Marmor & Gusmano, 2018). Especially as partisanship
continues to expand in the legislature and among the public, there are few aspects of health care
on which a majority of Americans can agree (Marmor & Gusmano, 2018). That is with the
exception of strong and growing support for universal health care. A 2017 poll found that 60% of
Americans and about 80% of Democrats believe the government has a responsibility to ensure
that all Americans have health care coverage (Pew Research Center, 2017). Based on this
statistic, universal coverage is the future of health care. If the legislative process functions as it
claims to, future health care legislation will reflect the wants and the needs of the people by
developing a system of health care that provides coverage and services to all Americans.
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Universal Health Care
Support for universal health care has been growing nationally and will continue to do so
with the aid of prominent political figures like Bernie Sanders (Gambino, 2017). A system of
universal coverage offers the opportunity to reduce expenditures on health care, while increasing
health outcomes for the population (Boudreau, 2017). By enrolling as many individuals as
possible, universal coverage disperses risk, reducing the financial burden of expensive
emergency care and health care for individuals with chronic, complex, or rare conditions
(Boudreau, 2017).
Universal health care also has the potential to equalize systemic inequalities that are
perpetuated under systems of selective coverage and exacerbate disparities like the health-wealth
gradient (Boudreau, 2017). Historically marginalized groups tend to achieve worse health
outcomes over their lifetimes but increasing access to health care could help offset the
disadvantages that arise from having a worse overall health status, experiencing poverty, or
living in an under-resourced community (Jones & Kantarjian, 2015). In other ways, access to
health care can compensate for the inequalities that develop from the social and natural lotteries
that persist for generations, such as the financial burden that accompanies hereditary illnesses or
health-related accidents (Jones & Kantarjian, 2015).
Despite the potential positive impacts of expanding the health care system to create
coverage for all, opposition to universal care is both strong and vocal (Boudreau, 2017). Many of
the arguments against an expanded system are founded in entrenched beliefs about the role of
government, opposition to welfare policies, and concerns about the cost to the individual and to
the nation (Boudreau, 2017). This opposition is especially potent when it comes to the issue of
universal health care through single-payer programming.
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Single-payer programs are unpopular largely because they are expensive to fund
initially, though they may result in an overall reduction in health care related expenses later on
(Galea, 2017). Single-payer programs, if run by the federal government, can also be perceived as
a massive, and unpopular, expansion of government control (Galea, 2017). Misconceptions about
the relationship between single-payer programs and universal health care abound, and they limit
the potential options in health care reform (Seervai, Shah, & Osborn, 2017). Single-payer
programs are not mutually inclusive with universal health care, though these terms are often used
interchangeably (Seervai et al., 2017). By nature, all the existing single payer health care systems
in the world are also universal health care systems, but not all universal health care systems are
single payer (Seervai et al., 2017).
Some of the most promising paths toward universal coverage in the United States are
mixed public and private systems. Given this nation’s historical and political penchant for
incremental reform, a mixed private and public plan may be a more realistic option because it
would require fewer changes to the existing system (Vladeck, 2003). Internationally, a majority
of nations with universal health care use a mixed public-private model where individuals who
can afford it enroll in voluntary or mandatory private insurance and the government supports
those who are unable to pay (Seervai et al., 2017).
Some scholars have suggested that the United States could achieve similar results by
addressing existing concerns with the Affordable Care Act (Abelson, Goodnough, & Thomas,
2017). Potential fixes to the ACA that could move the nation towards universal coverage include
stabilizing insurance marketplaces, decreasing prescription drug prices, fixing the family gitch,
and eliminating the insurance gap that exists for American that make too much for Medicaid but
not enough to pay for private insurance (Abelson et al., 2017). Revising the ACA would, of
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course, come with its own challenges just like single-payer programs. The stigma attached to the
ACA because of its association with the Obama administration and NFIB v. Sebelius, as well as
the actual difficulty of altering the existing legislation would present substantive challenges in
revising the ACA to create universal coverage (Abelson, et al., 2017).
The future of health in the United States could very well lie in universal health care, or it
could just as easily lie in a regression to a system that insures fewer individuals and rolls back
Obama-era reforms. The result five or ten years from now is dependent on a multitude of
political, economic, and social factors (Marmor & Gusmano, 2018). Contrary to what some may
think, Democrats gaining congressional majorities in the 2018 midterm elections is not a
guarantee that health care reform will happen any time soon, neither is a certain party winning
the presidency in 2020. The individuals in office are only one factor among many. History
demonstrates that the economy, public opinion, lobbying groups, and international affairs all
dictate, to a certain degree, what is possible in health care reform. In reality, the future of health
care is uncertain, and if the past offers insight into the future, no change may be the most likely
outcome.

Conclusion
Health care reform has not and will not come easily in the United States. The political,
economic, and social conditions in this nation have created our current health care system and, in
all likelihood, those same conditions will work to maintain it. Where the future of health care is
headed is a multi-trillion-dollar question, and one that no single policy analyst, politician, or
economist can answer. What we do know is that the issue of health care reform is profoundly and
alarmingly complex. When we conceive of health care reform as a simply partisan issue or a
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simply economic issue, we ignore this complexity. The result is a legislature, a president, and a
populous that defines health care reform as the antithesis of whatever the opposition has done.
There needs to be a fundamental shift in the way we develop and evaluate health care
reform. As a nation, let’s acknowledge that health care reform is difficult; that is sometimes
horribly convoluted, and that it will almost always be egregiously expensive. A functional health
care system is not, however, impossible to achieve or unworthy of the effort, because the health
of our nation depends on it.
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